This information came to me via email from COL John Witherell (RET) who at the time was the Battalion Commander. I asked him for his recollections of Operation “Flying Finn” and his comments were absolutely dead-on. His other observations, regarding what the battalion did after Tay Ninh; and especially how all of us “old soldiers” view the situation in Iraq today are certainly in sync with my own feelings; and my guess … most of yours as well.

Steve Watts (69-70)

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Email from COL John Witherell (RET)

Steve,

Recollections of old soldiers are always interesting and usually in the ball park. Military historians have commented frequently on the seeming disagreements among survivors of a battle about what really happened. As for Flying Finn, Major Hamilton took a few days to collect information from all sources and to make sense of the battle. The records in the TOC were undoubtedly a major source in his report and I presume you played a part. The report was quite thorough and helped bring some consolation for the considerable losses we suffered. It was the major battle in-country at the time and the enemy suffered terribly from our units and, in particular, the tactical air sorties and B-52 raids.

You were correct to remember January 5, the day the battle started. We had moved most of the battalion to an area north of Ike near the Mustang trail in response to indications of enemy activity (possibly building up for Tet). A so-called "double check 6" (radio intercept) message gave us a clue about where we would find the enemy: about 5 miles north of Ike. We had several platoons in the area and ordered the Recon Plat to assault into a triangular clearing adjacent to the signal location before noon. Platoons of D Co were also inserted in other clearings at about the same time. The point element of Recon was engaged in early afternoon, losing three men at the outset, with the remainder of the platoon pinned down. D Co platoons also came into contact at the same hour. The rest of the day was spent in trying to get Recon loose and bringing in B and C companies. B made a combat assault late in the day and nearly linked up with Recon, but couldn't disengage it. We also had a medevac chopper shot down, losing two men in the crash. Tough night for all units. We used a lot of artillery through the night to seal off escape routes

The next day (6 Jan) we got all our units separated from the enemy, which turned out to be the 2nd Bn of the 95C Regt, possibly 250 strong. We spent the day putting in tactical air strikes and then tried to sweep through the area. Ran into resistance again, so stopped the attacks, put in more tactical air strikes and got ready for B-52 strikes the next day. There were many secondary explosions, indicating a considerable ammo storage. We pulled out our units the next morning (7 Jan) to an open area near Ike and put in two separate B-52 strikes. They finished off any resistance and B and D were re-inserted to sweep through the bunker complex in late afternoon. They completed the sweep the following morning, finding total destruction and many bodies, weapons, ammo and destroyed bunkers. We lost 7 killed and had many wounded.

Looking back, we were following the tactics of the war: find, fix, fight and finish. In this instance we overdid the finding by getting too tied down initially, but all units then performed well; the air support was decisive to fighting and finishing and the artillery helped to keep the enemy in place by sealing off escape to the northwest. Your old company had the task of securing Barbara and Ike from attack by other enemy forces (intelligence indicated that possibility).

The move to Loc Ninh came as a surprise -- we moved the same morning we got the order. We worked with the 11th Armd Cav Regt there in quite a different setting from War Zone C. Our C Co got hit the first night, wounding the commander and making it necessary to replace him quickly. That was when Lt Brace took over the company. Capt. Carrier (D Co) was an outstanding field soldier and later went on to command the 1st Cav Div Ranger Co. Capt. Jones later worked for me at II Field Force Hq in the plans shop. We were there for the Cambodian operation in May-June 1970. That operation gave MACV and the VN forces a six-month breathing spell that allowed us to continue the US forces draw-down and ARVN forces to get control of the country. Quite a setback for VC and NVN forces. It was a very controversial back home, but militarily was a sound and positive move.

You are probably comparing your experience with what is going on in Iraq. I think all of us are doing the same, trying to understand how the troops and units are handling their tasks and missions. We can only wish them well and admire them for their actions. They have a difficult situation to say the least.

Finally, my so-called diaries reflect only the details of the day -- who I saw, things to do or check, what to plan, promotions, problems, training needs --but no reflections on the war. They are also hard to decipher, I'm sorry to say -- much of it consists of cryptic notes written while in the air. The Flying Finn days are forever etched in my mind, however, and the foregoing is a reasonable account. Your query has indeed rekindled a great many memories.

Again, my best wishes to you and yours, Jack Witherell